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Abstract
Intellectual property (IP) block reuse is essential for facilitating the
design process of system-on-a-chip. Sharing IP designs poses signifi-
cant high security risks. Recently, digital watermarking emerged as a
candidate solution for copyright protection of IP blocks. In this paper,
we survey and classify different techniques used for watermarking IP
designs. To this end, we defined several evaluation criteria, which can
also be used as a benchmark for new IP watermarking developments.
Furthermore, we established a comprehensive set of requirements for
future IP watermarking techniques.
Keywords: Intellectual Property Protection, IP Watermarking,
System-on-a-Chip, Digital Watermarking, Copyright Protection.
1 Introduction
Incremental changes to current design methodologies are inadequate for en-
abling full potential System-on-a-chip (SOC) implementation. The wide
availability of reusable virtual components or intellectual property blocks
(IPs) are most effective when it comes to reducing cost and development
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time of SOC designs. Sharing IP designs poses significant high security risks.
Most of these IPs need time and effort to be designed and verified, yet they
can be easily copied, or modified to cover the authorship proof. Creators and
owners of IP designs want assurances that their content will not be illegally
redistributed, and consumers want assurances that the content they buy is le-
gitimate. Watermarking techniques were widely used throughout history, for
copyright protection as well as data hiding. IP watermarking was introduced
as a candidate to protect this sensitive copyright information.
IP blocks are delivered in three main flavors depending on price, applica-
tions, and contracts between companies. The Virtual Socket Interface (VSI)
architecture document [44] describes such levels as:
Soft IP : are delivered in the form of synthesizable hardware design lan-
guage (HDL) code. They have the advantage of being more flexible and
the disadvantage of not being as predictable in terms of performance (i.e.,
timing, area, power). Soft IPs typically have increased intellectual property
risks because RTL (register transfer level) source code is required by the
integrator.
Firm IP : are optimized in structure and topology for performance and
area through floor planning/placement, possibly using a generic technology
library. Firm IPs offer a compromise between soft and hard. More flexible
and portable than hard, yet more predictive of performance and area than
soft. Firm IPs include a combination of synthesizable RTL, reference tech-
nology library, detailed floor-plan, and a full or partial netlist. Firm IPs
do not include routing. Risks are equivalent to those of soft IPs if RTL is
included and are less if it is not.
Hard IP : are optimized for power, size, or performance and mapped to
a specific technology. Examples include netlists that are fully placed, and
routed, or optimized custom physical layout. They have the advantage of
being much more predictable, but consequently are less flexible and portable
due to process dependencies. Hard IPs require, at a minimum, a high level
behavioral model, a test list, full physical and timing models along with
the final layout. The ability to protect hard IPs is much better because of
copyright facilities and there is no requirement for an RTL code.
The VSI Alliance IP protection development working group [15] identifies
three main approaches to secure IPs. First, a deterrent approach, where the
owner uses legal means trying to stop attempts for illegal distribution, i.e.,
using patents, copyrights and trade secrets. Second, a protection approach,
where the owner tries to prevent the unauthorized usage of the IP physically
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by license agreements and encryption. Protection techniques, mostly based
on model encryption [41, 43], or distributed environment [9, 10], fall short
in securing designs or track them in case they are stolen or reused without
permission. For such reasons, a third detection approach was introduced,
where the owner detects and traces both legal and illegal usages of the de-
signs as in watermarking or fingerprinting. This tracking should be strong
enough to be considered as evidence in front of a court if needed. The VSI
alliance proposed the usage of the three approaches for proper protection of
IP designs.
In this paper, we outline IP watermarking and fingerprinting techniques
for copyright protection, surveying the current state-of-art of IP digital wa-
termarking research. In order to evaluate the described techniques, we also
defined several evaluation criteria. Finally, we highlight the main technical
problems that must be solved before digital watermarking can be widely used.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes briefly the
preliminaries of digital watermarking that we found important to help with
reading the rest of the paper. In Section 3 , we introduce the evaluation
criteria developed, as well as different attack classes that a watermarking
technique might face. Section 4 overviews the state-of-the-art of approaches
used for IP watermarking. It describes the main advantages and disadvan-
tages of each technique, trying to evaluate them using the criteria defined
above. Finally, Section 5 extracts the main guidelines and conclusions for
future IP watermarking research directions.
2 Digital Watermarking
Petitcolas et al. [30] defined the term Steganography as “having a covert
communication between two parties whose existence is unknown to a possi-
ble attacker”. Steganography is divided into three main application classes
[30], (1) information hiding, which utilizes the secrecy and undetectability
of steganography to transfer secret data, used mainly for espionage applica-
tions, (2) content verification applications (authentication), where a fragile
watermark is introduced to secure the contents integrity; and (3) intellec-
tual property protection applications, where the watermark is mainly used
to convey the information about content ownership and intellectual property
rights.
Copyright marking (widely known as watermarking), as opposed to steganog-
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raphy, has the additional requirement of robustness against possible attacks.
Robust watermarking has the property of being infeasible to remove them
or make them useless without destroying the object at the same time. This
means that usually it has to be embedded in the most perceptually signifi-
cant components of the object [30].
Cover Media Embeded Data
Key
Key






Figure 1: Digital Watermarking
Figure 1 describes a generic model of watermarking [4]. The process is
divided into two parts: watermarking embedding, and watermark extraction
(also known as tagging and tracking, respectively). In the embedding phase,
the embedded data, which is the message that one wishes to send secretly, is
usually hidden in another media referred to as a cover-text, or cover-image (in
our case cover-code or cover-media). This produces the stego-text or other
stego-object. A key (stego-key) is used to control the hiding process, thus
restricting detection and/or recovery of the embedded data to parties who
know it (or who know some derived key value). This stego-key can be either
a public key or a private key depending on the scheme of the watermarking.
In the extraction phase, the stego-object is used with the key to extract the
watermark and identifies it.
Simmons [38] developed a mathematical representation for watermarking
problems based on what he called the “prisoners’ problem”. Simmons de-
scribed the watermark as a secret low bandwidth channel (called subliminal
channel) between two prisoners, who are trying to communicate although
they have been locked in a widely apart cells. The only means of communi-
cation between these prisoners was this secret channel passing through the
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wardens. Simmons [38] has defined such channel as a way for secret data
transfer. Yet, attacking this subliminal channel might pose limit destruction
to the system under investigation.
Subliminal channels provide a good secret communication channel, but,
without a proper robustness criteria, they cannot be used in copyright pro-
tection. This difficulty led to the introduction, of the supraliminal channel
by Cravar [8] as a better way for authorship protection. A supraliminal chan-
nel is defined as “a low bandwidth channel that the intruder cannot afford to
modify as it uses the most significant components of the object as a means
of transition”. It becomes in practice impossible for the intruder to alter
the message as he/she must either allow the message through or censor it
[8]. The effect of this technique is to turn an active warden, who tries to re-
move the watermark with different attacks, to a passive warden, who cannot
change or delete the watermark.
3 IP Watermarking Evaluation Criteria
Petitcolas [31] identified a set of measures for watermark evaluation. Al-
though these measures were developed mainly for multimedia applications,
we find some of them to be essential while evaluating any IP watermarking
techniques. Based on these points and the specific needs of hardware and
SOC design, we defined a set of requirements, which any IP watermarking
approach should satisfy:
1. Relying on the secrecy of the algorithm. According to one of
the oldest defined security rules, defined by Kerckhoffs [20] in 1883,
any encryption or security technique should not rely on the secrecy of
the algorithm, but to the mathematical complexity of such algorithm,
“The system must not require secrecy and can be stolen by the enemy
without causing trouble”. The approach should not depend on the
secrecy of neither the watermarking insertion nor extraction algorithms.
The algorithm should instead depend on one of the system properties
to protect the authorship data.
2. Level of reliability. This is a very important measure, which can
be divided into two main aspects: (1) robustness, which measures the
strength of the hidden mark against attacks, and the percentage of
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undetected watermarked design that might appear; and (2) false pos-
itive, which occurs whenever the detector could find a mark in a non-
watermarked design. Both measures are related to attack analysis and
will be discussed in details in the next subsection.
3. Affecting the design functionality. Testing and verification of
hardware systems is an extremely complicated task. In order to intro-
duce a watermark to the system, the watermarking technique should be
totally sound in the sense of its effect on the system behavior. Water-
marking techniques should prove their soundness against such a criteria,
preferably by proving it mathematically.
4. Preventing intruder from re-embedding another watermark.
As a passive technique, one of the main challenges of watermarking
schemes is the authenticity of the watermark. Scheme designers need to
find techniques to protect their designs from intruders who may try to
embed another watermark in the design at least to destroy watermark
authenticity in front of a court.
5. Embedding enough data to identify ownership. The watermark-
ing scheme should add enough data to identify the owner of the design.
This data should be concrete enough to be considered as an evidence in
front of a court. Nevertheless, the data size should be small enough to
neither impose a high overhead on the design size nor to affect the de-
sign performance. The amount of data embedded is one of the measures
used to differentiate between different IP watermarking techniques.
6. Implementation overhead. Watermarking a design is a complemen-
tary process to increase its competitiveness but affecting the design
performance or having a high overhead in the insertion process would
be considered a real drawback. For IP watermarking, we will consider
the area, power and delay overheads compared to the original design
without watermarking.
7. Detection and tracking. Watermark insertion is only half the process,
tracking and detection is the second important aspect in any water-
marking technique. Tracking and detecting the watermark or its traces
after possible attacks is essential. This will be considered as one of the
main aspects for judging watermarking techniques.
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8. Asymmetry. Since Diffe and Helman [11] presented their public en-
cryption scheme, public techniques have proven their strength espe-
cially in non-secure environments. Sharing IP designs poses the same
threats as other secret data in the public domain. Third parties, such
as brokers and sub-contractors, need to know the watermark key for
tracking purposes. But these parties are not considered secure entities.
Leakage and stealing IPs can still happen through in-house workers,
who may know the watermarking key. Asymmetric watermarking is
still considered a challenge in many media domains. Deleting water-
marks and attacking it is mostly related to the knowledge of its presence
and where it might be located.
3.1 Attacks Analysis
Digital watermarking attacks are categorized in four main classes [4]: unau-
thorized removal, unauthorized embedding, unauthorized detection, and sys-
tem attacks. The same categorization applies for IP watermarking schemes.
System attacks aim at attacking the concept of watermarking itself, such as
attacking the cryptographic base of the watermarking, or removing the chip
that checks the watermark physically in case of video media for instance.
This kind of attacks cannot to be avoided by the watermarking schemes.
The VSI Alliance IP protection scheme solves this by protecting the design
through different transactions.
3.1.1 Masking and Removal Probabilities
Removal attacks [4] aim at the removal of the watermark information. This
is tried without breaking the watermark, i.e., without searching for the key
used in the embedding. Removal attacks are divided into either elimination
attacks or masking attacks. The intruder tries to eliminate the watermark
completely in the elimination attacks. As an example, the intruder tries to
estimate the watermark and subtract it from the watermarked design. On
the other hand, masking attacks do not aim at removing the watermark itself,
but aim at distorting the watermark detector such that it will not be able to
sense the availability of the watermark.
The robustness of a watermark is measured through benchmarks in multi-
media domain, e.g., Stirmark [29] for images. Given the different nature of IP
designs, benchmarking IP watermarking schemes is harder than that of mul-
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timedia applications. IP watermarking schemes rely on probabilities instead
to prove the strength and robustness of their approaches. In the subsequent
text, we will define and use a set of probabilities that will help us to mea-
sure the watermark robustness. The main probabilities will be considered
mainly to measure masking, removal, and false-positives. Finally, because
those measures are directly related to robustness, asymmetry or public-key
operating mode will be addressed as well. We used the same set of probabil-
ities to calculate public-robustness, under an extra assumption stating that
the watermark-key is known beforehand.
We define the probability of masking (Pm) as ”the probability that any
attack would change or delete enough information to cover the watermark
without deteriorating the design under investigation”. This probability might
change depending on the way of watermark detection as well as the usage of
secret or public organizations of our scheme.
Deleting a part of the added signature might mask the watermark, yet,
the watermark traces the exist in the system can be detected using other tech-
niques and used in front of court. This means that sometimes, the intruder
needs to delete most of the watermark without deteriorating the design under
investigation. Thus, the removal probability of the watermark (Pr) can be
defined as ”the probability that any attack would delete the whole signature
without deteriorating the design under investigation”. Again this probability
depends on the way of operation (symmetric or asymmetric), and will be
discussed accordingly.
Asymmetric techniques in general are not considered as robust by the data
hiding society [31]. In our case, the main measure of our approach capability
to work in an asymmetric (or public-key) mode is P ar or P
a
m. Depending
on such measure, the system cannot work in the public mode unless these
probabilities are smaller than a certain value defined by the designer. It is
worth to be noted that a second secret watermark can be added to the system
in case the intruder could break the public one. This will add some extra
overhead on the system, but will be rewarded by a higher level of security.
3.1.2 Probability of Coincidence
The authenticity of the watermark, or the probability to find the watermark
by coincidence in a non-watermarked design (false positives), is measured by
the probability of coincidence. This probability is considered as a measure for
detecting the watermark in a design by accident in a non-watermark design.
4 IP WATERMARKING: STATE-OF-THE-ART 9
In [42], the probability of coincidence (Pu) was defined as “the odds that an
unintended watermark is detected in a design”. It is also considered as a mea-
sure for ghost attacks (discussed below). This probability will be calculated
for different approaches and used as a measure of watermark validity.
3.1.3 Embedding Attacks (Forging)
Embedding attacks aims at embedding another watermark in the design.
This can be done by ghost searching, where the intruder tries to find a ghost
watermark and consider it as his watermark. This is directly equal to the
probability of finding the false positives discussed earlier. Since watermark-
ing is a static technique, we think that such a problem can be solved by using
a secure third party, e.g., a watermarking governing body. This governing
body will be responsible for generating and distributing time-stamped au-
thenticated signatures, as well as keeping a record for such signatures for the
extraction phase. Figure 2 summarizes the above approach, where the secure
third part will use the ownership information provided by the IP designer
and encrypts it using any public/private-key encryption algorithm after time-
stamping it. The encrypted information is then hashed, hence giving a short
digest to decrease the watermark embedding overhead. This digest is com-
putationally infeasible to find another message that hashes the same value.
Such third entities is used in other types of media in a similar way to secure
the introduced watermark.
4 IP Watermarking: State-of-the-art
Many IP watermarking or fingerprinting techniques can be found in the
open literature. IP watermarking techniques can be classified into two main
classes: (1) dynamic watermarking, where the watermark cannot be detected
except by running the watermarked IP to detect the generated signal, such as
digital signal processing (DSP) or finite state machine (FSM) watermarking;
and (2) static watermarking, where the watermark is considered a property
of the design, and can only be detected by different static techniques, such
as route and placement watermarking.
In the next subsections, we are going to discuss the state-of-the-art of
different hardware IP watermarking techniques showing the advantages and



















Figure 2: IP Watermarking using a Third Entity as a Governing Body
disadvantages of each technique according to the evaluation criteria discussed
above.
4.1 Dynamic Watermarking Techniques
4.1.1 Test Sequence Watermarking
In [12], Fan et al., proposed a technique for securing IPs using the random
test sequences. After integrating the IP into the SOC, test signals have to
be traceable. Using this fact, the authors combined this test sequence with
the watermark generating circuit. This is done by integrating a watermark
generating circuit in the on-chip test module, so that whenever the design
gets into test mode, the watermark will be generated automatically. The
authors [12] proposed different ways to integrate the watermarking circuit
into the on-chip test circuit, bits generated from this sequence can be either
embedded as an extra bit for each test sequence, or the whole watermark
can be generated directly at the beginning or at the end. According to the
watermark information, the IP provider is able to verify the ownership rights
and does not need to examine the photomicrograph.
The approach is pretty novel, but examining the approach against the
evaluation criteria discussed above shows:
1. The approach does not watermark the IP, but mainly the test circuit.
The first attack that any intruder can think of is deleting the test circuit
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and adding his/her own. This will not affect the performance of the
design by any means. This means that in order to keep the watermark
secure, we need to keep the algorithm’s secrecy, i.e., Kerckhoffs’ rule.
2. Form the above, it follows that the approach has real robustness flow, it
cannot be used of course in an asymmetric mode. The authors did not
develop enough evidence to make us think otherwise. The calculation of
removal, and masking probabilities is not possible, because the design
is not touched, and deleting the watermark would be simple and direct.
3. The approach, on the other hand, can be used effectively as a comple-
mentary technique to generate the watermark inputs for other dynamic
techniques. This can be done especially because adding such data will
have minimal overhead on the system, where any part of the testing
circuits can be used.
4.1.2 Digital Signal Processing Watermarking
Digital signal processing (DSP) watermarking is introduced in [3] and [36] at
the algorithmic level of the design flow. The main idea of both approaches
introduced is based on the ability of designers to make minor changes in the
decibel (db) requirements of filters, without affecting their operation.
In [3], the designer of a high level digital filter should encode one character
(7 bits) as his/her hidden watermark data. Then the high level filter design
is divided into seven partitions where each partition is used as a modulation
signal of one of the bits. This means dividing the filter into seven parts and
use each part as a carrier signal with little db change if the bit is one or no
db change if the bit it zero.
In [36], the authors divided the problem into two parts. They have intro-
duced the watermark to both algorithmic and architectural levels, in order
to achieve more robustness. At the algorithmic level, they have introduced a
similar approach as [3], where seven bits are added. Yet, at the architectural
level, they have used a static approach in order to watermark the transpose
of the finite impulse response (FIR) filter [36]. Their approach is based on
using different structures of the filter building block according to the bits
needed to be embedded.
Both approaches have a low embedding overhead, as well as a low design
overhead. However, both are easily detectable as long as the DSP filter is
not covered totaly in the design. Both approaches can be used at the DSP
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algorithmic level, which is a pretty high level of the design flow. The authors
did not discuss the strength of their approach or any robustness criteria.
Besdies, the approaches depend on a very low data rate, just one character
(7 bits), which makes them really unpractical to be used in an industrial
environment. With such low bit rate, the watermark is extremely sensitive to
design fluctuations at the lower levels, like temperature or any other changes
in the environment that might causes high false positive rates or missing the
watermarked algorithm. Also, such a watermark is extremely sensitive to
masking attacks as the smallest changes in the filter function would mask or
even remove the watermark.
4.1.3 Watermarking Finite State Machines
At the behavioral level, Oliveira [28], and Torunoglu et al. [42] introduced
two different techniques used in the watermarking of sequential parts of the
design. Both algorithms are based on adding new input/output sequences
at the finite state machine (FSM) representation of the design. The main
advantage of both approaches is the ability to detect the presence of the wa-
termark at all lower design levels.
FSM Watermarking Based on Unused Transitions : In [42],
Torunoglu and Charbon introduced the first IP protection approach through
FSM watermarking. The algorithm is mainly based on extracting the unused
transitions in a state transition graph (STG) of the behavioral model. These
unused transitions are inserted in the STG and associated with a new defined
input/output sequence, which will act as the watermark.
The approach in [42] starts with building the FSM representation of the
sequential design, then visiting every state and finding the unused state tran-
sitions (input/output pairs). In case the FSM is completely specified (CS-
FSM), new input/output pairs are added to expand the FSM. The minimum
number of transitions needed (nmin) is then calculated, and compared to the
maximum number of free transitions (nmax) to satisfy the probability (Pu)
that a non-watermarked design would carry this watermark by coincidence.
If this probability cannot be satisfied, input/output pairs should be added
to satisfy the watermark requirements.
The input/output sequence is calculated, such that the input sequence
is random to the set of unused transition inputs. On the other hand, the
output, which is the hidden information, is encrypted using a key (K). Ex-
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tra transitions are added such that the output of the given input sequence
generates the encrypted hidden data, i.e., one should have both the key and
the input sequence to be able to read the watermark.
Figure 3 [42] shows an example of the watermarking process, where Figure
3 (a) shows the original design, Figure 3 (b) describes the watermarked de-
sign, and Figure 3 (c) shows another watermarked solution after augmenting

























Figure 3: FSM Watermarking Utilizing Unused Transitions
The approach works at a high level of the design flow, which provides ex-
tra strength, and does not depend on the secrecy of the algorithm as a way
of securing the design. The algorithm can be detected at mostly all lower
design levels, sometimes even after design manufacturing. The authors, how-
ever, used the probability of coincidence as the only measure for robustness,
which only covered the false-positives case. To evaluate the approach using
the proposed evaluation criteria, we had used the values generated by the
authors in [42] to calculate both the masking probability (P um) and the re-
moval probability (P ur ) for the IWLS93 [25] benchmark set shown in Table
1. Considering all transitions have equal occurrence probabilities, the mask-
ing probability (P um) can be calculated as “the probability that any attack
would delete at least one transition in order to cover the watermark without





Furthermore, the removal probability (P ur ) is calculated as “the probability
that any attack would delete all added watermark transitions without affecting
any of the original design transitions”. Hence, P ur can be calculated as
follows:




where Cnminn+nmin is the combination of nmin and n+ nmin.
Table 1: IWLS93 Benchmark Results using Unused Transitions Algorithm
Circuit ]I[O] ]T[S] (I/O)wm nmin Pu P um P
u
r Area%
S27 4[1] 34[6] 1/3 9 1.4e-11 0.2 1.4e-9 143
BBARA 4[2] 60[10] 1/1 10 9.3e-10 0.14 2.2e-12 74
DK14 3[5] 56[7] 1/0 7 2.9e-11 .095 1.8e-9 24
EX1 9[19] 138[20] 0/0 4 1.3e-23 0.028 6.7e-8 3.2
EX1 9[19] 138[20] 0/0 2 3.6e-12 0.014 1.02e-4 0.6
STYR 9[10] 166[30] 1/0 4 9.1e-13 0.023 2.9e-8 22
SCF 27[56] 166[121] 0/0 2 1.9e-34 0.011 7.1e-5 0.2
The measures provided in Table 1 showed how vulnerable the algorithm is
for masking attacks. Masking attacks do not delete the whole watermark, yet
they cover the authorship information, which means that the direct detection
method proposed by the authors is not reliable enough and exhaustive search
or the Genome search [42] will be the main watermark extraction method.
Besides, the removal probability (P sr ), although higher, is not high enough
in some cases to consider the system totaly secure, such as the case of SCF
(Table 1). On the other hand, the overhead starts high as expected with small
designs, yet it becomes negligible when designs get larger. The only problem
in this is that the authors did not rely on a fixed length signature, which
would raise questions about the amount of information embedded especially
in the large designs, for instance embedding only 40 bits in STYR (Table 1).
Finally, finding the input sequence that satisfies Pu and is not considered
with a high overhead on the STG is an NP-hard problem [28]. The authors of
[42] proposed exhaustive search, or Monte-Carlo search [2] to get over this,
yet solving this would propose a high overhead in the design phase. The
algorithm is immune for FSM reduction techniques, as the variables used are
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usually part of other transitions, which makes it real hard to remove.
FSM Watermarking by Property Implanting : The other FSM
watermarking approach available was proposed by Oliveira [28]. The author
tried to manipulate implicitly the STG of the finite state machine to implant
the watermark as a property in the new one.
To watermark a design as proposed in [28], the user should define an ar-
bitrary long string that clearly describes his/her ownership rights. This data
is considered as the watermark information. After encrypting this message
using a public key, the user should then use a one-way hash function, such
as MD5 [37], to obtain a compact signature of this arbitrarily long sentence.
The arbitrary sequence is then broken to input sequence combinations. For
example, if the design has 16 inputs, and the sequence is 128 bits, it defines
a unique sequence of 8 input combinations.
The user then changes the STG in such a way that the sequence of states
reached by this sequence of inputs exhibits a specific property, which is rare in
non-modified STGs. This property is purely topological and does not depend
on the specific encoding. If, later on, the watermark needs to be uncovered,
the designer provides this input sequence and the property he/she defined.
In order to define the input sequence to change the STG properties,
Oliveira [28] adds extra states and transitions in a systematic way to sat-
isfy this property. The algorithm has a low overhead on the design flow,
because it does not need to go through the FSM to find the unused transi-
tions (an NP-hard problem as discussed above). In [28], it is even proposed
to use a very strong way to build and implant the watermark without the
need of building the FSM of the design, i.e., low building overhead.
The author in [28] used a 128 bit signature, which is large enough to
identify different users. The approach depends on adding a counter that
checks for the input sequence expected and reaches a certain value to indicate
that the design has traversed the implanted watermark. This counter can
be a real weak point when it comes to masking attacks, as deleting the
counter or changing it means destroying the whole watermark. Also, the
counter, and the way the property is added should be secret in order to
insure proper security, Kerckhoffs’ secrecy law. The author in [28] did not
show how the probability of false positives are calculated, yet he mentioned
that he calculated and found that only 2 designs from the whole IWLS93
test bench might have higher probability of false-positives larger than zero.
Furthermore, the extra states added can be removed sometimes using a
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state reduction approach, the author in [28] considered this to be hard to
achieve in large designs, which is true because of the state-explosion problem
that would arise. Also, he proposed to solve this problem by slightly changing
the functionality of the STG. This is hard to be done mechanically as it is
pretty complicated and might affect the design functionality.
4.2 Static Watermarking Techniques: Constraint-Based
IP Watermarking
In [16, 17, 18, 19], Kahng el al. proposed a constraint-based IP watermarking
approach, which is a generic algorithm that can be used at different levels of
the design flow. The approach is based on the usage of available tools used
mainly to solve NP-hard problems. The algorithm adds extra constraints
to such solution, yielding to the new watermarked design. The approach
is based on a generic optimizer and constraint-satisfaction (SAT) problems
[17]. The watermarking tool proposed is mainly composed of the following
parts (Figure 4):
1) An optimization problem, which is an NP-hard problem that needs
constraints and heuristics to be solved.
2) An off-the-shelf optimization software/algorithm to solve such a prob-
lem.
3) A set of constraints that should be applied to the design.
4) A well-formed grammar to add extra-constraints to the previous ones
for building the required watermarked design. This is the main watermark-
ing tool, it is composed of a one-way encryption functions that converts the
watermark of the code to a set of well-formed constraints.
The watermark is presented to the constraint generator. In the generator,
the watermark is first encrypted, then transferred through a hash function
(to shorten its length). Finally, it is converted to a set of extra constraints,
through the well-formed grammar, forming a new set of constraints which
is added to the available ones. Both the design and the set of constraints
are fed to the black-box optimizer resulting in a watermarked solution. The
watermark is then a set of extra constraints that will limit the set of pos-
sible solutions to a smaller set. The watermark becomes stronger as the
“watermark subset” is smaller.
Kahng el al. [17] illustrated this approach using the a simple satisfiability








Figure 4: Constraint-Based IP Watermarking
(SAT) problem [13]. Many problems in hardware design are modeled as a
classical NP-complete constraint-satisfaction problem. For instance, let SAT
(U,C) be a finite set of variables U and a collection C = {c1, c2, ..., cn}
of clauses over U . The SAT problem relies on finding the set of all satis-
fying assignment (“truth assignment”) of C that satisfies all the clauses in
U . Adding extra constraints to such problem direct the solution to identify
uniquely the watermarked solution.
The proposed scheme is the dominant approach for hardware IP water-
marking designs, and although we classify it as a static approach yet some of
its applications can be dynamic. Due to the generic nature of the approach,
it was applied to different levels of the IP design flow. At the system level,
for instance, it was used to watermark memory graph coloring problems [14],
as well as graph partitioning problems [46] and linear programming problems
[26]. At lower design levels, the approach was used even more heavily woth
routing [27], placement, and floor planning [19]. In [34], Qu developed the
first public watermarking approach based on the above technique. His ap-
proach depends on implanting two watermarks, a public one to be seen by
everyone, and a private one in case this public one was attacked.
The constraint based technique was also used for fingerprinting by Lach
et al. [23], and Qu et al. [35]. The first algorithm divides the design into
parts and applies constraints watermarking to them. Adding a loose set
of different constraints on these parts will produce different fingerprinted
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solutions needed. Qu et al. [35] finger printed the design by dividing the
solution into two parts. The first part introduces a set of independently
relaxable constraints before solving the problem. In the second part, each of
these constraints is optimized alone to guarantee many solutions would be
achieved. Caldwell et al. [1] proposed a third fingerprinting approach based
on iterative optimization techniques to generate different solutions for the
same SAT problem.
Evaluating such technique is a complicated issue, because of the different
derivatives and applications of the technique. We tried to evaluate the main
algorithm giving different points that need to be tackled. The approach does
not have any secret part covered, i.e., it is not compliant with Kerckhoffs’
secrecy rule. Yet, the technique converts the signature to extra constraints.
Exposing the well-formed grammar that is used to generate the constraints
in any legal dispute, would weaken other watermarked designs. To solve
this, constraint generating tools that rely only on the key should be built
and verified.
The quality of the watermarked design is another problem that might be
caused by the constraints. For instance, some signature constraints might
contradict, or at least degrade the quality of the generated solution. To solve
this problem, Qu et al. [33] proposed the so-called “fair watermarking”.
They used the same approach before, but only embed a part of the signature
to keep the quality of the solution. Another attempt was done by Wong et
al. [45] who proposed three optimization-intense watermarking techniques
based in the constraint based approach to watermark decision problems.
Decision problems are usually hard to watermark, because the result should
be a decision, ’Yes’ or ’No’, for instance, and not like optimization problems,
where we might have many correct solutions. Their watermarking technique
tries to embed only a part of the signature that will still keep the authorship
proof, yet will not change the decision solution using iterations [45]. The main
problem faced by these approaches, is the need of iterations to watermark
the design, which might affect the overhead needed to add the watermark.
The idea of injecting the watermark in a non-linear problem by nature
gives it high strength. The watermark becomes a property of the design more
than added information, which makes it extremely hard to remove or mask.
Yet, Le-Van et al. [22] showed that several constraint-based watermarking
schemes can be broken easier than previously thought. The authors used
two different approaches to analyze these schemes. The first approach was
directed against graph coloring schemes [14], they did not remove the signa-
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ture but modified it so that another arbitrary signature could be extracted
by resolving the problem with a maximum of two extra colors. In the other
scheme, they attacked the FPGA watermarking proposed by Lach et al. [24],
where they located the embedded signature and then removed it. The au-
thors though, did not try to attack this approach at lower levels such as
placement [19] or routing [27]. We believe deleting the watermark at these
levels is much harder. The intruder in both techniques considered should
possess knowledge of the generated solution, something that is not usual, as
the designs are usually sold at lower design levels, and regenerating such a
solution would be extremely problematic. One of the techniques that is used
to overcome this attack is the so-called “localized watermarking” [21], where
the signature is divided into a number of small watermarks are randomly
augmented in the design. This gives the watermark an extra strength by
both, forcing the intruder to resolve each of the smaller NP-harder problems,
as well as watermarking different design parts in order to keep the design
from partitioning. Finally, The algorithm is missing an efficient tracking
technique that would help to track the watermark at different design levels.
4.3 Hierarchical Watermarking
Charbon, and Torunoglu [5, 6, 7] introduced a hierarchical watermarking
scheme based on a generic approach that can be used on different design
levels. The authors proposed the usage of multiple watermarks in different
abstraction levels in order to get a more secure system. The scheme in-
creases watermark robustness as the intruder needs to delete the watermark
in different levels. This hierarchy should not pose a high overhead on the
design cycle nor on the final watermarked product area or performance, since
the authorship information can be divided into many levels. Using such a
scheme means that the approaches below are mostly complementary. This
means that the designer should try to add his watermark to different levels
of the design, hierarchical watermarking, as well as to different modules of
the design to insure proper security and robustness to the design.
5 Conclusions
Sharing IP designs poses high security risks. IPs need time and effort to
be designed and verified, but they can be easily stolen or forged. Digital
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watermarking, used with most of the digital shared media, is considered a
solution for the copyright protection of IP blocks. It was introduced as a
way to protect both the owner and the customer rights against forging or
illegal distribution of the IP blocks. In this paper, we have first introduced
a set of evaluation criteria then surveyed the current state-of-the-art in IP
digital watermarking, and finally compared the different techniques available,
discussing major advantages and disadvantages.
IP watermarking schemes still need more development to be integrated in
the design cycle. Future IP watermarking schemes should be robust enough
to secure design, yet they should not imply a high overhead neither on the
design process nor on the final watermarked product. We believe that the dif-
ferent techniques introduced should be use both hierarchically [5] to protect
the design at different levels, as well as modularly to protect different parts
of the IP design. Adding a hierarchy of watermarks through the design cycle
can give a more robust watermark against attacks. Starting form high levels
of the design (i.e., system level) and integrating the watermark through many
design levels insures robustness, which decreases the risks of destroying the
watermark. These watermarks should be easily detectable at lower design
levels to insure proper tracking. Efficient watermarking schemes should also
use a public-key encryption algorithm in the watermarking process, thus al-
lowing third party entities (such as brokers) to get into the distribution cycle
without security hazards. Finally, IP watermarking developers are missing
a strong benchmark like those available, e.g., for photos. Such benchmark
would be a balanced measure for the strength of different approaches. Bench-
marking an IP watermarking scheme is harder than for instance photos as
the watermark might be spread in many design levels, given the different
nature of the design span of SOCs.
References
[1] A. E. Caldwell, H. J. Choi, A. B. Kahng, S. Mantik, M. Potkonjak, G.
Qu, J. L. Wong, “Effective Iterative Techniques for Fingerprinting Design
IP”, IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits
and Systems, February 2004, Vol. 23, No. 2, pp. 208-215.
[2] E.D. Cashwell, and C.J.Everett, “A Practical Manual on the Monte Carlo
Method for Random Walk Problems”, Pergamon Press, 1959.
REFERENCES 21
[3] R. Chapman, and T. S. Durrani, “IP Protection of DSP Algorithms for
System on Chip Implementation”, IEEE Transactions on Signal Process-
ing, March 2000, Vol. 48, No. 3, pp. 854-861.
[4] I. J. Cox, M. L. Miller, and J. A. Bloom, “Digital Watermarking”, Morgan
Kaufmann Publishers, 1998.
[5] E. Charbon, “Hierarchical Watermarking in IC Design”, In Proc. IEEE
Custom Integrated Circuits Conference, Santa Clara, California, USA,
May 1998, pp. 295 - 298.
[6] E. Charbon, and I. Torunoglu, “Watermarking Layout Topologies”, In
Proc. IEEE Asia South-Pacific Design Automation Conference, Hong
Kong, January 1999, pp. 213-216.
[7] E. Charbon, and I. Torunoglu, “Intellectual Property Protection Via Hi-
erarchical Watermarking”, In Proc. International Workshop on IP Based
Synthesis and System Design, Grenoble, France, December 1998.
[8] S. Cravar, “On Public-key Steganography in the Presence of an Active
Warden”, Technical Report RC20931. IBM Research Division, T. J. Wat-
son Research Center, July 1997.
[9] M. Dalpasso, A. Bogliolo, and L. Benini, “Virtual Simulation of Dis-
tributed IP-based Designs”, In Proc. ACM/IEEE conference on Design
Automation Conference, New Orleans, Louisiana, USA, June 1999, pp.
50-55.
[10] M. Dalpasso, A. Bogliolo, and L. Benini, “Hardware/Software IP Protec-
tion”, In Proc. ACM/IEEE Design Automation Conference, Los Angeles,
California, USA, June 2000, pp. 593-596.
[11] W. Diffie and M.E. Hellman, “New Directions in Cryptography”, IEEE
Transactions on Information Theory, 1976, Vol. 22, No. 6, pp. 644-654.
[12] Y.C. Fan, and H.W. Tsao, “Watermarking for intellectual property pro-
tection”, IEE Electronics Letters, September 2003, Vol. 39, No. 18.
[13] M. R. Garey and D. S. Johnson, “Computers and Intractability–A Guide
to the Theory of NP-Completeness”, W. H. Freeman And Company, New
York, 1979.
REFERENCES 22
[14] I. Hong and M. Potkonjak, “Techniques for Intellectual Property Pro-
tection of DSP Designs”, In Proc. IEEE International Conference on
Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing, Munich, Germany, May 1998,
Vol. 5, pp. 3133-3136.
[15] Intellectual Property Protection Development Working Group, “Intel-
lectual Property Protection: Schemes, Alternatives and Discussion”, VSI
Alliance, White Paper, Version 1.1, August 2001.
[16] A. B. Kahng, D. Kirovski, S. Mantik, M. Potkonjak, and J. L. Wong,
“Copy Detection for Intellectual Property Protection of VLSI Design”, In
Proc. IEEE/ACM International Conference on Computer-Aided Design,
San Jose, California, USA, November 1999, pp. 600-604.
[17] A. B. Kahng, J. Lach, W. H. Mangione-Smith, S. Mantik, I. L. Markov,
M. Potkonjak, P. Tucker, H. Wang, and G. Wolfe, “Constraint-Based
Watermarking Techniques for Design IP Protection”, IEEE Transactions
on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems, ctober
2001, Vol. 20, No. 10, pp. 1236-1252.
[18] A. B. Kahng, J. Lach, W. H. Mangione-Smith, S. Mantik, I. L. Markov,
M. Potkonjak, P. Tucker, H. Wang and G. Wolfe, “Watermarking Tech-
niques for Intellectual Property Protection”, In Proc. ACM/IEEE Design
Automation Conference, San Francico, California, USA, June 1998, pp.
776-781.
[19] A. B. Kahng, S. Mantik, I. L. Markov, M. Potkonjak, P. Tucker, H.
Wang and G. Wolfe, ”Robust IP Watermarking Methodologies for Phys-
ical Design”, In Proc. ACM/IEEE Design Automation Conference, San
Francico, California, USA, June 1998, pp. 782-787.
[20] A. Kerckhoffs, “La cryptographie militaire”, Journal des sciences mili-
taires, vol. IX, January 1883, pp. 5-38, February 1883, pp. 161-191.
[21] D. Kirovski, M. Potkonjak, “Localized watermarking: Methodology and
Application to Template Mapping”, In Proc. IEEE International Confer-
ence on Acoustics, Speech, and Signal Processing, Istanbul, Turkey, June
2000, Vol. 6, pp. 3235-3238.
REFERENCES 23
[22] T. Le-Van, and Y. Desmedt, “Cryptanalysis of UCLA Watermarking
Schemes for Intellectual Property Protection”, In Information Hiding,
LNCS 2578, Springer-Verilog, 2002, pp. 213-225.
[23] J. Lach, W.H. Mangione-Smith, M. Potkonjak, “Fingerprinting Tech-
niques for Field-Programmable Gate Array Intellectual Property Pro-
tection”, IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of Integrated
Circuits and Systems, October 2001, Vol. 20, No. 10, pp. 831-836.
[24] J. Lach, W.H. Mangione-Smith, M. Potkonjak, “Robust FPGA Intellec-
tual Property Protection through Multiple Small Watermarks”, In Proc.
IEEE/ACM Design Automation Conference, New Orleans, Louisiana,
USA, June 1999pp. 831-836.
[25] K. McElvain, “LGSynth93 Benchmark Set: Version 4.0”,
Http://www.cbl.ncsu.edu/pub/Benchmark dirs/LGSynth93/, 1993.
[26] S. Megerian, M. Drinic, and M. Potkonjak. “Watermarking Integer Lin-
ear Programming Solutions”, In Proc. IEEE/ACM Design Automation
Conference, New Orleans, Louisiana, USA, pp. 8-13, June 2002.
[27] N. Narayan, R. D. Newbould, J. D. Carothers, J. J. Rodrguez, and W.
Timothy Holman, “IP Protection for VLSI Designs Via Watermarking of
Routes”, In Proc. IEEE International ASIC/SOC Conference, Washing-
ton, DC, USA, September 2001, pp. 406-410.
[28] A. L. Oliveira, “Techniques for the Creation of Digital Watermarks in
Sequential Circuit Designs”, IEEE Transactions om Computer-Aided De-
sign of Integrated Circuits and Systems, Vol. 20, No. 9, September 2001,
pp. 1101-1117.
[29] F. A. P. Petitcolas, R.J. Anderson, and M. G. Kuhn, “Attacks on Copy-
right Marking Systems”, In Information Hiding, LNCS 1525, Springer-
Verlag, 1998, pp. 219-239.
[30] F. A. P. Petitcolas, R. J. Anderson, and M. G. Kuhn, “Information
Hiding- A Survey”, Proceeding of IEEE, July 1999, Vol. 87, No. 7, pp.
1062-1078.
[31] F. A. P. Petitcolas,“Watermarking Schemes Evaluation”, IEEE Maga-
zine on Signal Processing, Vol. 17, No. 5, September 2000, pp. 58-64.
REFERENCES 24
[32] G. Qu, and K. Potkonjak, “Analysis of Watermarking Techniques for
Graph Coloring Problem”, In Proc. IEEE/ACM International Conference
on Computer-Aided Design, San Jose, California, USA, November 1998,
pp. 190 - 193.
[33] G. Qu, J. L. Wong, and M. Potkonjak, “Fair Watermarking Techniques”,
In Proc. of Asian-Pacific Design Automation Conference, Yokohama,
Japan, January 2000, pp. 55-60.
[34] G. Qu, “Publicly Detectable Watermarking for Intellectual Property
Authentication in VLSI Design”, IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided
Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems, Vol. 21 , No. 11, Nov. 2002,
pp. 1363 - 1368
[35] G. Qu, M. Potkonjak, “Fingerprinting Intellectual Property Using
Constraint-Addition”, In Proc. IEEE/ACM International Design Au-
tomation Conference, Los Angeles, California, USA, June 2000, pp. 587-
592.
[36] A. Rashid, J. Asher, W. H. Mangione-Smith, and M. Potkonjak,
“Heirarical Watermarking for Protection of DSP Filter Cores”, In Proc.
IEEE Custom Integrated Circuits Conferance, Orlando, Florida, USA,
May 1999, pp. 39-42.
[37] R. Rivest, “RFC 1321: The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm”, Network
Working Group, 1992.
[38] G. J. Simmons, “The History of Subliminal Channels”, IEEE Journal
on Selected Areas in Communications, May 1998, Vol. 16 , No. 4, pp.
452-462.
[39] G. J. Simmons, “Results Concerning the Bandwidth of Subliminal Chan-
nels”, IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, May 1998,
Vol. 16 , No. 4 , pp. 463-473.
[40] E. M. Sentovich, K. J. Singh, L. Lavagno, C. Moon, R. Murgai, A.
Saldanha, H. Savoj, P. R. Stephan, R. K. Brayton, and A. Sangiovanni-
Vincentelli, “SIS: A System for Sequential Circuit Synthesis”, Technical
Report, Dept. of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science, University
of California, Berkeley, California, USA, 1992.
REFERENCES 25
[41] Synopsys Inc., “Verilog Model Compiler datasheet”,
http://www.synopsys.com/products/lm/ip/vmc ds.html, 1999.
[42] I. Torunoglu, and E. Charbon, “Watermarking-Based Copyright Pro-
tection of Sequential Functions”, IEEE Journal of Solid-State Circuits,
February 2000, Vol. 35, No. 3, pp.434-440.
[43] Topdown Inc., TopProtect datasheet, 1999,
http://www.topdown.com/topprotect/tp dsheet.htm.
[44] VSI Alliance, “VSI Alliance Architecture Document: Version 1.0”, VSI
Alliance, 1997.
[45] J. L. Wong, G. Qu, and M. Potkonjak, “Optimization-Intensive Wa-
termarking Techniques for Decision Problems”, IEEE Transactions on
Computer-Aided Design of Integrated Circuits and Systems, January
2004, Vol. 23, No. 1, pp 119-125.
[46] G. Wolfe, J. L. Wong, and M. Potkonjak, “Watermarking Graph Par-
titioning Solutions”, IEEE Transactions on Computer-Aided Design of
Integrated Circuits and Systems, October 2002, Vol. 21, No. 10, pp 1196-
2204.
